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Abstract
A standard metric used to measure the approximate optimality of policies in imper-
fect information games is exploitability, i.e. the performance of a policy against
its worst-case opponent. However, exploitability is intractable to compute in large
games as it requires a full traversal of the game tree to calculate a best response
to the given policy. We introduce a new metric, approximate exploitability, that
calculates an analogous metric using an approximate best response; the approxima-
tion is done by using search and reinforcement learning. This is a generalization
of local best response, a domain specific evaluation metric used in poker. We
provide empirical results for a specific instance of the method, demonstrating that
our method converges to exploitability in the tabular and function approximation
settings for small games. In large games, our method learns to exploit both strong
and weak agents, learning to exploit an AlphaZero agent.1
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence research has long used games as a venue for progress, including results in
Checkers [25], Chess [12], Jeopardy [14], Poker [22], [9], and Go [26], among other results. Using
standard metrics, such as the game score in the Atari Learning Environment [6], has helped in fair
and rigorous evaluation of algorithms, driving progress in (deep) reinforcement learning. In this
paper we study two-player, zero-sum games, which have been the focus of much research, and have
been used as common benchmarks in AI since the field’s inception. In perfect information games,
head-to-head play or statistics derived from head-to-head matches, such as the Elo rating system, is
commonly used as the central evaluation metric; if two agents play some number of games against
each other, and one beats the other, then the winning agent is ranked higher than the losing agent, and
either win rates are reported or ratings are computed from such match outcomes.
However, match results only provide a relative ranking, and the order of the ranking can be affected
by a variety of small details, including the population of agents [4]. Head to head play is also
problematic when agent performance is not strictly transitive [3, 23], which is not uncommon in
imperfect information games. Absolute metrics, such as exploitability, which measures the distance
of a joint policy from a Nash Equilibrium, requires a significant engineering effort to calculate in
large games [18]. Exploitability provides guarantees for the worse-case performance of agents,
however, while it is (barely) feasible for Heads-up Limit Texas Hold’em (HULH), having roughly
1014 decision points, other games are much, much larger, such as Heads-up No Limit Texas Hold’em
1This is not the same AlphaZero used in the original paper, but a version trained separately by the authors for
this paper.
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(HUNL) (with around 10160 decision points [17]) or Go (approximately 10170 decision points [1]). In
these games, computing a best response strategy, which is at the heart of exploitability, is intractable.
As computing a best response strategy is intractable, the computer poker community has proposed
an algorithm to compute a lower-bound using a local best response (LBR) [21]. LBR combines
explicit inference about the opponent’s private state with a shallow search and simple poker-specific
heuristic value function. While LBR has proven to work surprisingly well in poker, it relies on a
hand-designed poker heuristic and so is not a domain independent metric.
We propose a domain-independent alternative that replaces the domain-specific search procedure
with a guided search trained explicitly to exploit the agent to be evaluated. Fixing one agent’s policy
makes the environment a single agent one [7]. One can thus use standard reinforcement learning (RL)
algorithms to compute a best response [15]. Learning a best response has another, potentially very
appealing, benefit. Exploitability itself does not tell the full story about the strength of an agent. A
strong chess agent that could be beaten by a particularly clever line of play is a better chess player
than an agent that always resigns. Yet, both of these agents have the same exploitability (i.e. both are
maximally exploitable). By learning the best response, we can assess the strength of the agent by
looking at how difficult it is to learn to exploit it (e.g., by how much training is required.)
We present a large-scale implementation of this framework, where we learn an approximate best
response in a variety of games of both perfect and imperfect information. Our experimental section
includes small games where comparing to the exact best response is tractable, as well as results in
large games of perfect information, where exact exploitability is neither feasible nor useful.
2 Background and Terminology
An extensive-form game is a sequential interaction between players i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}∪{c}, where
c is the chance player, i.e. a player following a static, stochastic policy to define the transition
probabilities given states and actions. We use −i to refer to every player other than i and the chance
player. In this paper, we focus on the 2 player setting, and in particular, the two-player, zero-sum
setting where beliefs about the opponent’s private state are tractable, i.e. sufficiently small to be
represented in memory. The game starts in the root (or empty) history h = ∅. On each turn, a player
i chooses an action a ∈ Ai, changing the history to h′ = ha.2 Here h is called a prefix history of h′,
denoted h @ h′. The full history is sometimes also called a ground state because it uniquely identifies
the true state, since chance’s actions are included. In poker, a history includes all the players’ private
cards in addition to the sequence of actions taken. We define an information state s ∈ S for player
i as the state as perceived by an agent which is consistent with its observations. Formally, each s
is a set of histories, specifically h, h′ ∈ s⇔ the sequence of player i’s observations along h and h′
are equal. Informally, this consists of all the histories which the player cannot distinguish from each
other given the information available to them. In poker, an information state groups together all the
histories that differ only in the private cards of −i.
We call Z the set of terminal histories, which correspond to the end of a game. Each z ∈ Z has a
utility for each player ui(z). We also define τ(s) as the player who is choosing an action at s, and
use Z(h) to denote the subset of terminal histories that share h as a prefix. Since players cannot
observe the ground state h, policies are defined as pii : Si → ∆(Ai)(s), where ∆(Ai)(s) is the set
of probability distributions over Ai(s).
As an example, in Texas No-limit Hold’em Poker, the root history is when no cards have been dealt
and no betting has happened. The history includes the private cards that have been dealt, while the
information state for player i includes the private cards for that player, and the information that the
other player has received cards, but not which cards those are. Both the history and the information
state include all public cards and all betting actions. A terminal history consists of the state when
either a showdown has occurred or a player has folded. The ui(z) is then the number of chips that
each player has won.
In a perfect information game such as Chess or Go, the history is identical to the information state,
since everything is public. As is common in perfect information games, we use an encoding of the
2Note that we include c, chance, as a player, so this will include all chance actions, e.g. all cards (both public
and private) that are dealt.
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current board state (or a stack of recent ones) as input for training, following [26]. ui(z) is 0 for a
loss, 1 for a win, and 0.5 for a draw when possible (e.g. in Chess).
We assume finite games, so every history h is bounded in length. The expected value of a joint policy
pi (all players’ policies) for player i is defined as
vi(pi) = Ez∼pi[ui(z)], (1)
where the terminal histories z ∈ Z are composed of actions from the joint policy. We assume that
players have perfect recall, i.e. they do not forget anything they have observed while playing. Under
perfect recall, we can obtain the distribution of the states using Bayes’ rule (see [27, Section 3.2]).
2.1 Optimal Policies
The standard game-theoretic solution concept for optimal policies in two-player zero-sum games is
Nash equlibrium, defined as a strategy profile where none of the players benefits from deviating
unilaterally. A strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2) is a Nash equilibrium if
∀pi′i : vi(pii, pi−i) ≥ vi(pi′i, pi−i) (2)
In two player zero sum games, this concept is equivalent to the minmax solution concept (this is true
for both perfect and imperfect information games).
max
pi1
min
pi2
v1(pi1, pi2) = min
pi2
max
pi1
v1(pi1, pi2) = v
∗
1 (3)
The unique value of (3) is referred to as the game value — v∗. Both solutions concepts thus optimize
against the worst case opponent — the best response. The best response to a policy pii is defined as
b(pii) = argminpi−i vi(pii, pi−i). The optimal policy pi
∗
i is then guaranteed (on expectation) to receive
at least the game value ∀pi′−i vi(pi∗i , pi−i) ≥ v∗i .
2.2 Exploitability
For suboptimal policies, the worst-case value is strictly less than the game value: δi(pii) =
v∗i − vi(pii, b(pii)). A common measure then is NASHCONV(pi) =
∑
i δi(pi) and exploitabil-
ity = NASHCONV(pi)|N | . Furthermore, the -minmax (or -Nash equilibrium) policy is one where
maxi δi(pi) ≤ .
While computing the game value is in general as hard as computing an optimal policy, one can
compute the exploitability of a policy profile without access to the game value. Simple algebra reveals
that NASHCONV (where the last operation follows since v∗1 = −v∗2):
NASHCONV(pi) =
∑
i
δi(pi) =
∑
i
v∗i − vi(pii, b(pii)) =
∑
i
vi(pii, b(pii)) (4)
Exploitability thus measures the quality of a strategy profile — the closer that exploitability is to zero,
the closer to the optimal policy. However, exploitability is difficult to calculate in large games, as it
requires a full tree traversal. This is intractable in games such as HUNL poker, with approximately
10160 decision points — more than the number of atoms in the universe.
3 Approximate Best Response
By fixing the policy of one agent, the environment becomes a (stochastic) single agent environment
[7]. The best response is the optimal policy in that environment, and the exploitability is then the
reward that said optimal policy would achieve.
As this is a single agent environment, one can use standard reinforcement learning methods to learn an
optimal policy [15], and while exploitability is defined using the optimal best-responding policy b(pii),
we are learning to approximate this policy, and can thus define a corresponding metric. We denote the
approximate best response as ABRi(pii), and define the corresponding APPROXIMATENASHCONV
as:
APPROXIMATENASHCONV(pi) = ANC(pi) =
∑
i
vi(pii,ABRi(pii)) (5)
3
Note that since the game is zero-sum, the sum over the expected value of playing pi by all players
sums to 0. Approximate NashConv is thus NashConv with an approximate best response rather than
the exact best response; similarly, we have approximate exploitability.
3.1 Local best response
Rather than learning the best response, the poker community has used local best response (LBR) [21]
as a proxy for the full best response [22, 10]. LBR approximates the best response by performing a
local search aided with a value function, which has historically been a hand-crafter heuristic function.
LBR is able to exploit a surprising number of winners from the Annual Computer Poker Competition
[2].
The “strength” that we discuss is almost identical to exploitability; a “strong” agent would be one
that is hard to exploit, whereas a weak agent would be open to exploits. In practice, it’s impossible to
calculate exploitability in large games, so we rely on approximations, such as whether or not an agent
can be beat by humans (professional or otherwise), or how an agent performs against techniques
that have theoretical guarantees. For instance, DeepStack [22] or Libratus [9] would be considered
“strong” agents as they have both beaten professional human players and are theoretically guaranteed
to converge to a Nash Equilibrium, while UniformRandom is a "weak" agent as it can be beaten by
an amateur human player. Defining strength is non-trivial in this domain, so one motivation of this
paper is to provide another metric that will help clarify what kind of exploits (and their severity) can
be found by a learning agent enhanced with search.
There are a number of issues with LBR. Although it is a simple metric to understand, it has some
issues. For instance, it’s performance varies significantly with the abstraction chosen. We have seen
results that vary dramtically depending on if the "fcpa" abstraction is used or if the "fc" abstraction is
used. In particular, we have seen better performance when ’fc" is used, which is counter-intuitive, as
the "fcpa" agent is able to make the same choices as "fc". This can be seen in table 3 of the LBR
paper, where the "56 bets (1-4)" abstraction is beaten by "fc (1-4)" in a number of contexts, despite
the latter being a strict subset of the former.
3.2 Approximate Best Response Search
We now describe a particular instance of ABR where we learn the approximate best-response. LBR
is a method which performs a depth-limited tree search, using a value function to truncate the search.
This is similar to MCTS, which has been shown to perform remarkably well with a learned value
function [26]. As such, a natural extension to LBR is to combine it with MCTS. Since we consider
imperfect information games in addition to perfect information games, we use a variant of information
set MCTS (IS-MCTS) to sample world states when searching [13]. In particular, the world state
sampling distribution (also called the determinization distribution) is the exact posterior given the
opponent’s policy, so the underlying search returns a true best response action given the opponent
is playing according to their policy. We call this algorithm approximate best response, which is
IS-MCTS with access to the opponent’s policy during search. See Algorithm 1.
We do not search using the real history (rather than the information state) as doing so would lead to
policies where the players act as if they know the hidden information of all other players, which is
more than what a best response policy is allowed to know.
T is the sequence of states and actions taken starting from h. r is the return associated with that
particular Monte Carlo rollout, which either comes from a terminal history if the search reaches a ter-
minal history, or from the value network otherwise. GETNODEFROMSEARCHTREE(s) retrieves the
node corresponding to the current information state from the search tree. Each node contains the aver-
age return received from previous simulations. SAMPLEHISTORYFROMINFOSTATE samples a new
history (i.e. private information for the opponent) from the exact belief distribution according to the
opponent’s policy. RUNIS-MCTS-SIMULATION, UPDATESEARCHTREE, and CHOOSEACTION
follow the standard MCTS algorithm following [26]; implementations of this algorithm include [20]
and [24].
We use an experimental setup that is identical to [26] except where otherwise noted. We use a
distributed actor/learner setup to train our neural network with parameters θt on training iteration
t, which is trained to predict prior policy pit via the normalized visit counts as a policy vector pt,
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Algorithm 1: Approximate best response search.
input :n — number of simulations
input :pi−i — fixed policy for opponent
input :s — infostate to choose an action at
input :fθ — value and policy network
output :a ∈ Ai — action for the current infostate
1 N = GETNODEFROMSEARCHTREE(s)
2 for i = 1, . . . , n do
3 h = SAMPLEHISTORYFROMINFOSTATE(s).
4 T , r = RUNIS-MCTS-SIMULATION(h,N , fθ)
5 UPDATESEARCHTREE(T , r).
6 p = NORMALIZEDVISITCOUNTS(N )
7 a = CHOOSEACTION(N )
8 return (a,p);
Game Evaluator Policy ANC ANC (%) NashConv
Liar’s Dice Tabular UniformRandom 1.52 97.44% 1.56
Liar’s Dice Function approximation UniformRandom 1.47 94.23% 1.56
Liar’s Dice Function approximation A2C 1.53 96.84% 1.58
Leduc Poker Tabular UniformRandom 4.72 99.58% 4.74
Leduc Poker Function approximation UniformRandom 4.07 85.86% 4.74
Leduc Poker Function approximation A2C 4.46 93.31% 4.78
Table 1: ABR against UniformRandom and A2C. ANC is ApproximateNashConv (Eq. 5).
along with the expected reward vt predicting game outcome zt using a loss function that combines
the mean-squared error, cross-entropy loss, and `2 regularization:
(pit, vt) = fθt(s), (6)
lt = (zt − vt)2 + piTt log pt + c‖θt‖22 (7)
θt = GRADDESCENT(θt−1, αt, lt) (8)
Here, vt is the predicted value of a state, pt is the predicted search outcome which is used as a prior,
and z is the Monte Carlo return for the episode (i.e. the outcome of the self-play game). The reward
and prior are learned for information states, not histories, and thus the network learns an average
across histories, which should converge to the expected value of playing from s, allowing the agent
to make decisions according to the information state value.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We now describe our empirical evaluation, starting with an overview of the setup. We discuss
the hyper-parameter tuning and values of the hyper-parameters in the appendix. We ran ABR
against UniformRandom in a number of games. In Table 1, we report the results on small imperfect
information games (IIGs) using both the tabular and function approximation evaluators. We note that
both versions came close to the exact exploitability, which is unsurprising given how small the games
are.
4.1 ABR in Small Imperfect Information Games
We ran a series of experiments in small games using a neural network to learn the value and policy
functions. Table 1 demonstrates the results. The ANC quickly converges to the same value as the
exact best response.
Following this, we trained an A2C agent in Liar’s Dice and Leduc Poker for 100 thousand episodes,
using the default hyper-parameters from [20]. As A2C is not known to produce low exploitability
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Leduc Poker CFR+1000 A2C
CFR+1000 -0.094 0.72
A2C -0.72 0.05
Liar’s Dice CFR+1000 A2C
CFR+1000 -0.03 0.655
A2C -0.655 -0.06
Table 2: Results from playing head to head. Column is player 0, row is player 1. Reward shown is the average
over 1024 games for the row player.
Policy ANC ANC (%) LBR LBR (%) NashConv
AlwaysFold 1.50 100 1.50 99.7 1.50
AlwaysCall 1.61 69 2.31 99.1 2.33
UniformRandom 8.71 98.9 5.69 64.6 8.80
Table 3: Results from playing ABR against various chump policies in Heads Up Limit Texas Hold’em. Units are
in big blinds per game. ANC is ApproximateNashConv. ANC(%) is equal to ANC/NashConv · 100%.
agents in imperfect information games, we have no reason to believe this agent is strong, which is
consistent with the exploitability of our agents, which was calculated to be 1.58 for Liar’s Dice, and
4.78 in Leduc Poker— worse, in both cases, than UniformRandom, indicating that these agents are
highly exploitable. In the tabular setting, our agent is able to closely approximate the exact best
response, with the approximation accuracy being very close to 100%. In the function approximation
setting, there are some issues due to the error introduced by approximation, but our agent is able to
learn a fairly accurate approximation, being roughly 85% in Leduc Poker and 97% in Liar’s Dice.
4.2 Head-to-Head Results
In perfect information games, a common metric is head-to-head performance (win, loss, and draw
rates). In imperfect information games, head-to-head performance is not sufficient to assess the
quality of a policy. In Table 2, we show the head-to-head performance of CFR+ [28] run for 1000
iterations and the trained A2C agent discussed above. CFR+ exploits the A2C policy by 0.72 in
Leduc and 0.655 in Liar’s Dice. However, the NashConv and ApproximateNashConv of the A2C
policy is much higher, as seen in Table 1 giving us a more accurate understanding of the quality of the
policy, with ApproximateNashConv values of 4.46 in Leduc, and 1.53 in Liar’s Dice. These results
demonstrate the importance of considering exploitability in the measure of the quality of an agent,
since head-to-head performance alone can be misleading, and the robustness of an agent or policy is
relevant to its overall assessment.
4.3 ABR against Known Strategies in Heads-Up No-Limit Poker
To compare ABR to LBR, we ran ABR on known “chump” strategies in the game of Heads-up
No-Limit Poker with a fold/call/pot/all-in betting abstraction, as done in [21]. The resulting game is
quite large, with 4.42 ·1013 information sets. We use these strategies as the exploitability values are
known, as they can be calculated analytically. Table 3 shows the approximate exploitability values
found for each known strategy, and compares the approximation quality to LBR. Except for the case
of AlwaysCall, ABR is able to match the exact values through learning and search, rather than using
poker domain knowledge heuristics. In the case of AlwaysCall, LBR has the distinct advantage that
the heuristic used corresponds to exactly what the opponent is doing. Additionally, ABR is able to
fully exploit UniformRandom whereas LBR is not. This shows the shortcomings of LBR: the specific
choice of heuristic can introduce bias in the bound produced, and can fail to fully exploit even weak
agents.
4.4 AlphaZero
We ran ABR against an implementation of AlphaZero [26] trained from scratch in Chess and Go.
See the appendix for full details on the training setup. In these experiments, ABR sampled from the
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opponent’s prior during search, but played against the agent using the listed number of simulations in
Figure 1. In Chess, we trained an agent for 400 thousand minibatches. ABR was able to exploit the
agent after 50 thousand minibatches, but not after 100 thousand minibatches or more. We believe this
is due to the lack of signal, as the network is unable to find any initial exploits, and is thus unable
to win, starving the agent of learning signal. One potential way to fix this is to train the value and
policy network to predict the results from running the agents in selfplay against each other, and use
that to initialize the ABR network, rather than randomly initializing it. The policy network itself is
quite weak, and is unable to beat a level 0 Stockfish agent, while the full agent is able to beat the
level 5 Stockfish agent, but not any stronger versions. See appendix for a more detailed overview of
the strength of the AlphaZero agents that were trained, as well as a discussion of the evaluation. This
indicates that the 50000-step trained policy is exploitable, as one would expect.
In Go, we see much stronger results, with a caveat. The AlphaZero agent that was trained is able
to beat both [5] with 100 thousand iterations and [11] 100% of the time using the policy network.
ABR is able to learn a highly effective exploit against the AlphaZero agent no matter the number
of simulations used by AlphaZero. As we increase the number of simulations, it takes significantly
longer for ABR to find an exploit. This is consistent with the strength estimate we have of the agent;
as we give it more time to search, it is harder to exploit. The high exploitability of the agent in Go
occurs as ABR learns to exploit the end of game scoring behaviour of the AlphaZero network. If
humans were playing, they would remove the dead stones and count this as a win for AlphaZero;
however, this is not what most computer Go environments do. The appendix contains example games
and a detailed overview of this behaviour.
Figure 1: ABR results in perfect information games.
We also present results using function approximation against various chump policies in Heads Up
No Limit Texas Hold’em in Table 3. We see that ABR is able to come reasonably close to the
exact exploitability, and compares favorably to LBR. LBR only performs better than ABR against
AlwaysCall, which is unsurprising, as LBR assumes that the opponent uses AlwaysCall as their
strategy, making AlwaysCall the ideal opponent for LBR. Against UniformRandom, ABR drastically
outperforms LBR. This is unsurprising, as to win against UniformRandom, a multiple step lookahead
is necessary, which LBR does not do. The best response for AlwaysFold is possible to calculate with
a one-step lookahead— namely, to always bet— so it makes sense that LBR is able to find this.
Then, we ran ABR against A2C trained for 100 thousand steps using the default hyper-parameters
from [20]. We played A2C head-to-head against CFR+ [28] trained for 1000 iterations, with the
results in Table 2. CFR+ has an exploitability of approximately 10−5 after 1000 iterations in Leduc
Poker. When played head to head against an exploitable agent, CFR+ failed to fully exploit the
opponent, winning 30% of the possible reward. In Liar’s Dice, CFR+ was able to win 87% of the
7
possible reward. This inability to fully exploit the opponent is not a property of CFR+, but a property
of the −Nash Equilibrium strategy that CFR+ learns. See [19] for more details.3
Figure 1 demonstrates the result of running ABR search algorithm in Chess playing against Uniform-
Random. In Go and Connect Four, ABR quickly learns to win almost 100% of the time. In Chess,
the algorithm struggles with draws, and draws roughly 10% of the time. We think that the tabular
results demonstrate that our method converges reasonably quickly, and the function approximation
results versus A2C demonstrate that the algorithm can scale to exploit learned agents in large games.
Future work will analyze the ability of ABR to exploit strong agents in large games.
4.5 Discussion
It should be noted that it is computationally expensive to train a deep RL agent to optimality. In
particular, training an agent in a large game like Chess or Go requires a large distributed computation.
Our experiments used 64 TPUs for acting and 4 TPUs for learning over one day. This is expensive,
and as such, there is not a strong argument to prefer approximate exploitability over exploitability
if calculating exploitability is feasible. ABR as a technique is preferable to exact exploitability in
large games, as it scales much better. Similarly, LBR is a strong technique for poker games, and
although we demonstrate slightly better results in a small number of scenarios, that is no reason to
avoid LBR. It is the fact that ABR can be used in almost any two-player, zero-sum game without
additional work that is the strength of the technique. For context, a best response in Leduc Poker for a
tabular policy can be calculated in 30µs, while our implementation takes 150s to use ABR, a factor of
5 million times more expensive, despite using a highly optimized multithreaded C++ implementation.
However, it is feasible to run ABR on Go or No Limit Texas Hold’em, while calculating exploitability
on such a game is nearly impossible4. Additionally, ABR has a meaningful interpretation in perfect
information games against deterministic opponent, while exploitability does not.
5 Conclusion
We introduce a new metric to support evaluation in large games. This metric provides a lower bound
on the exploitability of algorithms in a wide class of games. We hope that this metric will be used to
advance the state of the art in large games research.
Additionally, there are a number of techniques that compute Nash Equilibria which have struggled
to work in large-scale games of imperfect information, such as [16]. One potential area of future
work is to use our method to extend [16] to large games, or as the exploiter in a setting similar to
[29]. A shortcoming of our approach is that ABR can only run on tractable belief spaces as we must
explicitly construct the exact belief vector. We plan to address this in future work.
6 Impact Statement
This algorithm consists of foundational research, and there are no applications in mind other than
evaluating reinforcement learning algorithms in board game environments. However, algorithms
can be used in many different ways, and our work could have unforeseen circumstances. This work
provides a scalable evaluation metric for reinforcement learning algorithms in two-player, zero-sum
settings, and as such, could be used to further the state of the art in reinforcement learning research
in those settings. The authors are not aware of any such applications, but they certainly exist; one
example might be to make agents that interact with humans more robust, as ABR would be a good
way to find exploits for such. Phrased differently, ABR could also be used to find exploits for RL
agents that interact with humans. For instance, this could be used to find exploits for bots in games.
Another application might be in finance; if someone was doing algorithmic trading, ABR might be an
effective way to learn to exploit that trading strategy. Conversely, a positive impact would be that
ABR could be used to detect when such an agent is exploitable, and allow the developers of it to fix
3Consider Rock/Paper/Scissors; the Nash Equilibrium strategy is UniformRandom, which will tie Al-
waysRock, despite AlwaysRock having a simple exploit.
4Taking O(N ) time to calculate the best response, where N is the number of states in the game, which for
Heads-Up, No Limit Texas Hold’em is O(10160).
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those holes. In general, however, agents that interact with uncontrolled opponents should be designed
in a robust manner, so we do not think that ABR is a particularly risky algorithm to publish.
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Appendices
A Hyper-parameter tuning for ABR
In our experiments, we had two separate implementations of ABR. One was used for the experiments
on imperfect information games, and one was used for the experiments on the perfect information
games. For the imperfect information games, we did a series of hyper-parameter sweeps. The only
hyper-parameters that had a significant impact were the number of simulations, which had a massive
impact, the virtual loss, and the number of threads used to run simulations. We found broadly similar
results with a variety of network architectures, UCT exploration parameters, optimizers, etc. The
hyper-parameters used for the experiments on imperfect information games are listed in Table 4. We
used a number of iterated grid searches to find the optimal hyper-parameters, where for each one, we
varied a single hyper-parameter and kept the rest constant. We varied each of the hyper-parameters
listed below. We also tried decaying the learning rate but it didn’t have a substantial impact. We also
tried using a convolutional network, and it didn’t have a significant impact.
Parameter Value
UCT C 2.6
L2 Coefficient 5e− 6
Num simulations 800
Virtual loss 4
Num layers 8
Num hidden units 128
Learning rate 10−5
Min size to learn 512
Learning batch size 512
Actor batch size 32
Table 4: Hyper-parameters used in experiments for imperfect information games.
For the runs we did against AlphaZero, we used the hyper-parameters from [26]. We did not do any
hyper-parameter tuning due to the cost of running experiments, and other than fixing bugs, the results
we report are those from the first runs done in each setting.
As a sanity check, we did a number of additional runs against the AlphaZero Chess network to verify
that we got similar results, which we did. See Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Results from 3 separate runs of ABR against AlphaZero in Chess.
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B Game sizes
C AlphaZero
We implemented [26] using [8]. We ran our experiments using the hyper-parameters listed in [26],
with the following modifications. We ran the experiment for 550 thousand minibatches, each of size
2048, saving the network every 500 minibatches. We used an exponentially decaying learning rate,
beginning at 0.05, and decaying it exponentially with a period of 200 thousand steps and a decay rate
of 0.1. This agent is quite weak as it is roughly comparable to level 0 Stockfish.
In Go, we ran the experiment for 350 thousand minibatches, each of size 4096, saving the network
every 500 minibatches. We used the same learning rate schedule as [26]. The final policy network
was able to win 100% of the time against [5] with 100 thousand simulations, as well as against [11]
level 10. This thus appears to be a quite strong network, and with simulations, is stronger still.
In all cases, we gave each player 100ms to think per move. The AlphaZero agent used 16 threads to
perform evaluations, and ran on the same machine as the opposing agent, i.e. a single Cloud TPUv2.
D Go exploits
In Fig. 3, it appears that the ABR player never passes until the board is almost filled in, then when
both players pass— ending the game— the game is a win for the ABR player. However, until the
end, the AlphaZero player predicted it would win. Thus, it appears that ABR was able to find a board
for which AlphaZero had the value wrong. Our best guess as to why the AlphaZero player played
as it did, is that, during the selfplay training, it only saw boards like this at the very start, and as
such, forgot that this would lead to a loss. As such, ABR has learned to take the AlphaZero player
somewhere where the network is wrong, and is able to win by exploiting this discrepancy.
To make an analogy to the adversarial example literature, this is comparable to finding a noise image
that a CNN would classify as a dog; this is not finding an image of a dog that the CNN would classify
as a car.
When we look at the prior that the trained AlphaZero network assigns, the network assigns very low
priors to passing, and so passing does not show up in the search tree until the very end of the game.
When it does, the value that is learned is wrong; the value that is assigned by the value network is
wrong, as it predicts a win (specifically, it predicts a value of 1.0, which is a very confident win). Then,
given the low prior value, AlphaZero is unable to do enough search to find the correct value. With
enough search, the algorithm is able to find that the correct value is low, and predicts (in one instance)
that it has a value of 0.23. However, given the strength of the prediction from the neural network, this
is enough to overpower it, and it has so many visits, that the agent chooses pass regardless.
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Figure 3: Example exploit that ABR finds in Go. This is the terminal board. Our AlphaZero agent is playing as
white, and ABR (i.e. the exploiter) is playing as black.
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